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Abstract: 
Capability Approach yang dikembangkan oleh Martha Nussbaum dapat 
memperkuat landasan antropologis dalam berbagai usaha mewujudkan kesejah-
teraan umum (bonum commune) dalam masyarakat plural. Dengan pendekatan 
induktif dan pengakuan akan kemampuan dasariah manusia untuk selalu 
berkembang, Capability Approach menunjuk pada pluralitas bentuk kebaikan yang 
oleh Nussbaum dieksplisitkan dalam sepuluh bidang kemampuan dasar manusia 
(basic capability), terutama penalaran praktis dan afiliasi. Di satu sisi, pemberian 
ruang bagi tumbuhnya kesepuluh kemampuan dasar tersebut adalah ambang batas 
(threshold) bagi terwujudnya kesejahteraan umum dalam masyarakat plural. Di 
sisi lain, prinsip kesejahteraan umum dapat memperkuat perspektif komunitarian 
dari kemampuan untuk memilih (choice) yang mendapat peran sentral dalam 
Capability Approach. 
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After the publication of Amartya Sen’s 
Development as Freedom,  the capability 
approach gained much attention for giving 
a broader conception of development. 
Alongside with Martha Nussbaum in the 
field of political philosophy, the capability 
approach endeavors to show the inade-
quacy of major economic thinking on 
development. To assess the quality of life, 
we must focus on the question of what 
people are capable to do and to be. The 
United Nations in their annual Human 
Development Report documented this 
paradigmatic shift.  
If we read carefully the capability 
approach proposed by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, we can find a clear 
intersection with the principle of common 
good in the Catholic social tradition. It is 
quite understandable, because both of them 
originate from the Aristotelian view of the 
good society. Aquinas’ reading on Aristo-
telian metaphysics heavily influences the 
classic understanding of the common good. 
On the other hand, Martha Nussbaum 
bases her proposal on ten central capa-
bilities in her reading of politeia as Greek 
social democracy.   
In that powerful intersection, this paper 
seeks some coherence between these two 
approaches and to point out their diver-
gence on the role of choice in the societal 
context. I make three conclusions from this 
dialogue.  
a. The common good tradition should use 
the capability approach to strengthen 
their anthropological stand. In this plu-
ralistic society, the modern interpreta-
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tion of the common good should be 
inductive in its method and should 
respect the different idea of goodness 
within and among cultures. The idea of 
perfection and natural law as the foun-
dation of the common good should be 
interpreted inductively and not deduc-
tively. The capability approach with its 
strength in inductive reasoning for 
tracing various areas of human capabi-
lity can give the common good theory 
the anthropological strength and back-
ground to understand the idea of 
perfection and natural law in this 
pluralistic world.  
b. The common good and the capability 
approach assure the human capability 
to communicate and to build common 
understanding through intellectual soli-
darity. Both theories come from the 
Aristotelian conviction that human 
beings are social in nature. Therefore, 
human beings will seek each other to 
create communio (common good 
theory) or affiliation (Nussbaum). Both 
theories also affirm the importance of 
participation as the community’s inner 
dynamic to create a better society. In 
this situation, intellectual solidarity can 
be defined as the disposition to streng-
then multicultural affiliation.  
 Human freedom, as a fundamental 
entitlement in capability approach, and 
community are not in vis-à-vis oppo-
sition. Human being performs his 
freedom in the community, and the role 
of community is to foster people’s ability 
to choose the better way to flourish as a 
person. The phenomenology of langu-
age affirms the relation of freedom and 
community. The capability approach 
should draw the richness of cultural 
embeddedness to understand the 
societal context of human freedom from 
the common good tradition.
This paper consists of three parts. The 
first part surveys the development of the 
common good theory from Thomas Aquinas 
to the modern reappraisal in the context of 
multicultural society. The second part pre-
sents the Aristotelian trajectory in Martha 
Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities and the 
applicability of Aristotelian human flouris-
hing in social democracy. The third part 
assesses the convergent and divergent point 
in dialoguing the notion of the common 
good and capability theory.  
PART I - THE ON GOING TRADITION 
OF COMMON GOOD  
Tracing the Origins: Thomas Aquinas on 
Common Good 
The Western tradition is very familiar 
with the concept of the common good as 
the normative vision of good life in the 
community. However, it is not easy to find a 
comprehensive definition of this concept in 
the Greek classical moral philosophy, 
European Christian theology, or early 
modern Christian spirituality.
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Roughly speaking, there are two major 
approaches in Catholic theology in dealing 
with the world, Augustinian and Thomistic. 
Augustine, influenced by Neoplatonism, 
views the world of creation deeply impacted 
by sin, where the human ability to percept 
reality is easily fooled by disordered human 
lust. Grace is important in helping corrup-
ted human beings to discern the will of 
God. On the other hand, Aquinas uses the 
Aristotelian conviction that the world of 
senses provides a wide opportunity to 
develop various human goodnesses. Human 
beings have rationality to discern the 
ultimate truth because the world is locus 
revelationis of truth. Aquinas does not 
neglect the reality of sin, but he believes in 
the human capability to grow in the journey 
to know the good. On this very point, he 
lays out his teleological vision of good.
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Aquinas uses the Aristotelian hierarchical 
pattern of existence to show the inter-
connectedness of the good. Since God is 
the ultimate good, this hierarchical pattern 
will show that everything, from the most 
simple to the most complex entities, 
participates in God’s goodness in their own 
degree. 
This term participation is very 
important in Aquinas metaphysical thin-
king. Aquinas describes participation as 
partem capere (taking part of something) 
and partem habere (having a part from 
something). Aquinas says that “to parti-
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cipate is like taking a part; thus when 
something receives a part of what belongs 
to another fully, it is said to participate in 
it”.5 Take an example: hot soup comes from 
two different entities taking part in each 
other, the soup and the heat. There is 
mutuality between these two entities; then 
participation can be looked from the one 
who participates (the soup) or from the 
position of which it will participate (the 
hot). It is the relation of giving and taking 
part. By this mutual relation, Being moves 
toward its telos, to perfection.  
In De Veritate, Aquinas write “since the 
essence of good consists in this, that 
something perfects another as an end, 
whatever is found to have the character of 
an end also has that of good. Now two 
things are essential to an end: It must be 
sought or desired by things which have not 
attained the end, and it must be loved by 
things which share the end, and be, as it 
were, enjoyable to them.”6 On the one 
hand, for a thing to exist, it must exist in 
participation to perfect something else, to 
assist the other to their fullness. But, on the 
other hand, if someone wants to participate 
in the process of perfecting another, she 
must “love” the thing that she wants to 
share and put it as her own goal. On this 
way, the dynamic of giving and taking is 
preserved. The human law then must 
incorporate and secure this dynamic incli-
nation to perfection in the society.
7
   
By that fundamental reason, Aquinas 
claims that the human being is not just an 
animal rationale but also an animal sociale. 
Maritain proposes three reasons for this 
claim. First, humans have an ability to love 
and communicate with other. This internal 
drive urges them to find and relate with 
other humans. Second, because of their 
material inadequacy, human beings interact 
with each other to gain their basic needs. 
Stepping aside from society means cutting 
away the resource for their needs. Third, in 
order to develop their ability and to fulfill 
their vocation to perfection, human beings 
needs to learn from society, especially by 
education.
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In this rich notion of Thomistic meta-
physic, we can understand deeply Mater et 
Magistra’s definition of the common good 
as “the sum total of those conditions of 
social living, whereby men are enabled 
more fully and more readily to achieve their 
own perfection.”9 The common good is a 
field of participation for perfection in the 
society. A person must relate and 
participate with other persons to attain 
their fullness of life. They cannot live alone 
in society, and society will help them by 
setting up “those conditions of social living” 
so they acquire their basic needs to 
flourish.  
Modern Appraisal of the Common Good 
Still departing from Aquinas’ thinking 
on the common good, modern interpreters 
use several approaches in addressing the 
notion of the common good. The first 
approach is equating the common good 
with public good or public service. There 
are two characteristics of a public good/ 
service. First, it is nonrivalrous in con-
sumption. We do not need to conflict when 
we use it.  For example: a beautiful beach 
is a public good. When someone enjoys this 
beach, other people have the same right to 
use it. The other characteristic of a public 
good is that it can be enjoyed by everyone 
without exception (non-excludible). For 
example: clean air is a public good because 
everyone can enjoy it. However, clean air in 
gas cylinders is excludible, because only the 
one who buys the cylinder can legitimately 
enjoy it. Since the public good should be 
available to everyone, the benefits of public 
goods should not be reserved to individuals/ 
groups only.  
The second approach to the notion of 
the common good focuses on the internal 
conditions of society that make every 
member of the community participate and 
contribute to a shared public good. This 
approach echoes Gaudium et Spes’ defini-
tion of the common good as "overall condi-
tions of social life, which allow both groups 
and individual members, to achieve more 
fully their own perfection."
11
 According to 
this line of thought, the quality of human 
relationship is more important than the 
public good itself. Society can provide the 
public good if only their members commit 
themselves to make those goods open to the 
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public and not just for private consumption. 
Consequently, being a member of a com-
munity (commune) itself is a form of 
goodness (bonum). Members of the 
community are "non-rivalries" and "non-
excludible" in sharing the public good 
because there are connections charac-
terized by mutual respect. 
The new understanding of pluralism 
urges the common good theory to answer 
the new challenge: why does modern 
pluralist society need to listen this ancient 
notion of the common good? Hollenbach 
states three reasons for a pluralist modern 
society to pay attention to the concept of 
the common good.
12
 First, the fact of 
pluralism in all aspects of our life invites 
society to find a new philosophy that pays 
more attention to the relations and 
cooperation among human beings. Tole-
rance has been glorified as the highest 
value in a pluralist society, but it fails to 
answer the new questions that arise. We 
cannot address the question of AIDS in 
Africa or global warming merely by 
tolerance. Cooperation and human relation 
provide a new key factor in addressing our 
common problem. Second, there is a new 
awareness that the concept of identity is 
found through interaction within tradition 
and between communities. The personal 
search for liberty disconnected from the 
network of human relations is not an 
adequate basis for the concept of human 
identity. Third, globalization and new 
economic practices underscore the impor-
tance of interdependence between human 
beings. Economics is not a "solo activity" 
but an activity in the community for the 
common good. 
Because the common good encom-
passes all conditions that make each person 
or group reach her fullness and work 
together to interpret the good life, Hollen-
bach then proposes the concept of intellec-
tual solidarity as a precondition for building 
the common good. He defines intellectual 
solidarity as “an orientation in mind that 
appreciates differences between various 
kinds of tradition as a stimulus for intellec-
tual engagement beyond the limits of 
religious and cultural boundaries.”13 There 
are a couple of constitutive elements in 
intellectual solidarity. First, intellectual 
solidarity is the process of deliberation that 
requires the principles of reciprocity and is 
supported by the attitude of civility. Second, 
human rights are an institutionalization of 
human solidarity; and human freedom 
itself is not defined only as negative free-
dom (e.g. freedom from fear and coercion) 
but also as freedom to promote the 
goodness in society. This freedom manifests 
itself in the willingness to engage in the 
public sphere. 
The Common Good and Communio 
As Maritain has said, the common good 
is not a collection of private goods. It is 
impossible to put all private goods under 
one big umbrella called the common good. 
The common good is built through consen-
sus and active involvement of all members 
of the community. In this case, intellectual 
solidarity has an important role in creating 
a sense of connection between members of 
the community, and then facilitating mutu-
al networking and empowerment. 
It is clear that the common good can 
only be built in a community because only 
in the community, we can establish and 
maintain the agreements on living together. 
Willingness to build community is essential 
for the achievement of the common good. 
Critiques of liberalism clearly point out the 
tendency of modern man to live alone and 
to be reluctant to live in an active commu-
nity.  It is ironic that when the world 
becomes more interconnected, the quality 
of human relations receives less attention. 
People may live freely just next door, but it 
is difficult to treat them as brothers. 
Therefore, modern Catholic thinkers iden-
tify human relations as a major dimension 
for interpreting the common good for this 
pluralist society. Creating conditions that 
allow each individual/ group to reach their 
fullness starts from encouraging the 
willingness of all members to live in the 
community. Without such awareness, it is 
impossible to avoid political realism, a view 
that every political effort does no more than 
satisfying certain group interest.  
Hollenbach quotes Cicero’s statement 
in stressing the importance of finding a 
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sense of relation in this pluralistic world: 
“Res publica, res populi, populus autem 
non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo 
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris 
consensus et utilitatis communio socie-
tatis”.  For Cicero, the republic is a matter 
of the people. The people are not just 
individual person assembled together in 
one place, but they constitute the together-
ness of the people in recognition of the law 
and in participation in public interests. So, 
iuris consensus (consensus about the law) 
and communio utilitatis societatis (commu-
nio that meets the interests of its member) 
are the keys in community life. Living 
together must become a communio. It 
means citizens meet and talk to each other 
about public issues. Therefore, participation 
is required. Tolerance proves to be 
insufficient as a modus vivendi in a plu-
ralist society because tolerance cannot solve 
complicated problems that occur in our 
world, such as poverty and environmental 
destruction. Globalization on the one hand 
can widen the gap between the rich and the 
poor because the poor do not have equal 
access to capital. But on the other hand, 
with globalization, mutual cooperation can 
increasingly grow through global net-
working. 
PART II - ARISTOTELIAN 
TRAJECTORY IN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
Overview of the Capability Approach  
Amartya Sen firstly proposed the capa-
bilities approach in the context of develop-
mental studies. In his Tanner Lecture, Sen 
criticized John Rawls’ theory on the 
distribution of primary goods. Rawls puts 
more focus on how to make the just prin-
ciple in distributing the primary good, but 
he does not acknowledge the discrepancies 
of people in accessing those goods. Take an 
example of people with disabilities. The first 
Rawlsian principle of just distribution will 
assure that they will get the same amount 
as other members of the society. But 
because of their disability, they will struggle 
much more (e.g. limited by their wheel 
chair movement) in assessing the good. 
Finally, they will get much less amounts of 
public goods compared with other members 
who don’t have the same obstacles. 
Similarly, accessing drinking water in the 
African dessert will require more efforts 
with small result than with Bostonians who 
can easily get good tap water in their 
kitchens. So, rather than establishing a 
basic principle for distributing the basic 
goods, it is more important to promote the 
basic conditions in such a way that people 
with his different background and 
difficulties can have better accessed to the 
basic goods. 
The capabilities approach is also well 
aware of utilitarian reductionist tendency in 
viewing development in terms of the fulfill-
ment of people’s desire.  Utilitarianism 
fails to recognize that the richness of basic 
goods cannot be assessed as maximizing 
people’s happiness as the single metric 
criteria. The notion of desire and happiness 
is deeply embedded in the social construc-
tion of culture. For very wealthy people, 
happiness means buying luxurious jewelry, 
and for the working class family in 
Indonesia to eat chicken twice a week is 
already a blessing. Nussbaum and Sen show 
that women in repressive cultures are 
prone to adapt to and accept the unjust 
condition and incorporate it as a new value, 
because it is hard for them to break the 
cultural chain. The utilitarian development 
approach fails to recognize this “adaptive 
preference” in viewing human happiness.  
Providing greater access in development 
starts with the answer to this basic 
question: what are people actually able to 
do and to be? By entering the space of 
capability, we can grasp a better understan-
ding about social justice and equality and 
also how society should manage their 
resources to secure these goods. Sen and 
Nussbaum have a different tone when 
talking about capability as a basic measure 
to assess development. While Sen focuses 
more on the comparative use across nations 
as presented in the United Nations of 
Development Program since 1990, Nuss-
baum put her attention on the constitu-
tional process in which citizens can ask the 
government to secure a threshold for them 
to live decently. 
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Aristotle on Just Distribution and 
Capabilities 
Influenced by Aristotle and Marx, 
Nussbaum states that the political 
arrangement must rest on the priority of 
good.  For Aristotle, political arrangements 
have two categories: broad and deep. Broad 
means they are open to everybody, not just 
a few elite or rich people. They are deep, 
because political arrangement is not just 
concerned about distributing material good 
but also with “totality of the functioning 
that constitute the good human life.”  Due 
to the broadness and depth of political 
arrangements, Aristotle sees that goodness 
has an instrumental feature. Goodness 
becomes the context that gives meaning to 
the certain activity. Aristotle use a simple 
question in contextualizing the good: “what 
for?”. Wealth –for example- has a meaning 
for certain activity like “buying and selling”. 
Everything has a purpose for something. 
So, in making a priority of the good, we 
cannot separate the goodness from its 
context, its specific end. Since goodness 
always exists in a context, it is the duty of 
the lawgiver to make the distribution 
related to the context of the people. In 
other words, the lawgiver must address the 
particularity of the people in the polis. 
Acknowledging particularity prevents 
someone for getting too many resources 
and others getting less. This is a form of 
“just distribution” in Aristotle’s era.   
Nussbaum relates the “just distribution” 
theory from Aristotle as differentiating 
between polis and oikos. One major 
difference feature between city and 
household is how to handle plurality. The 
city recognizes and preserves plurality, but 
the household doesn’t. Plurality arose from 
the sense of togetherness. In this case, 
togetherness is not defined as wholeness 
but as being together in caring for each 
other. For Aristotle, togetherness in caring 
for each other is the foundation of just 
distribution. It acknowledges plurality and 
difference between people, but at the same 
time, it sets social arrangement so that the 
lower level of society can get enough 
resources to function well.  
In relation to the deep characteristic of 
political arrangements stated above, the 
distribution theory in Aristotle is more than 
the allotment of commodities. Distribution 
relates to the flourishing life, to strengthen 
the capabilities in human beings. For 
Aristotle, the aim of political arrangement 
in the polis is setting various conditions for 
citizens to choose and live a good human 
life.  It is the job of the lawgiver to consider 
how society can help people to live flouris-
hing lives, to create a context in which a 
person can choose.   
But, what is capability in Aristotle? 
Nussbaum finds three different notions of 
capabilities: internal capabilities, external 
capabilities, and combined capabilities.  
Internal capabilities refer to any activity 
that treats people in such a way that they 
can act and choose well for their flourishing 
life. It is a basic capability that makes other 
capabilities grow. For example: the polis 
will arrange public funding to help the 
people from all classes to get better food 
and education.  The twofold reasons be-
hind this arrangement are: through proper 
meals, people –especially the youth- can get 
the basic “nutrition” to grow and healthy; 
by good education, they can get best 
training to reflect their role or function 
(ergon) in the society. Proper food and 
education are basic capabilities for human 
flourishing.  
External capabilities refer to social 
conditions that make internal capabilities 
able to grow. One example is time for 
leisure. The polis makes an arrangement 
that people do not get trapped in endlessly 
repetitive work and have enough time to 
care for their own bodies. The other 
external capability is political participation. 
In Politic 1329b39 ff, the common meal is a 
form of social engagement, “and all citizens 
should participate in them, but it is not easy 
for the poor people to bring in the required 
contribution and to manage the rest of their 
household affairs”. It is interesting how 
Aristotle proposes the solution for this 
discrepancy on the capability to engage in 
social activity. He proposes to make a land 
reform, so that there will be enough public 
funding to support the poor to engage in 
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the common meals, and also in religious 
festivals. The private ownership is still kept 
but the polis tries to manage how to support 
the poor by a kind of “public funding” in 
order that they will still be able to partici-
pate in public.   
The combined capability is defined as 
“internal capabilities plus the social/ poli-
tical/ economic condition in which functio-
ning can actually be chosen.”  Of course, 
we cannot make a sharp distinction bet-
ween internal capability and combined 
capability since developing internal capa-
bility needs social arrangements that make 
it possible. Later on, Nussbaum develops 
this combined capability as ten central 
capabilities, which will be presented in the 
next part.  
Nussbaum claims that her theory of 
capabilities is freestanding from any meta-
physical doctrine or epistemology, from 
religion or anti religion. Influenced by her 
Marxist reading of Aristotle, we can get the 
intuitive idea of human dignity from “sen-
sitivity to the actual circumstances of 
human life and choice in all their multipli-
city”. For Marx, the plurality of human 
activities shows that human beings are not 
just the “herd” of a “flock.” We are not 
animals that only eat and breed. We are 
guided by practical reason and longing for 
sociability. Education nurtures our ability to 
use our senses, invests time for leisure and 
enjoyment of play. She called this method 
of reasoning “internalist essentialism”, 
which is basically Socratic questioning in 
order to determine what is indispensable 
and the minimal quality of life to be called a 
human being.  
Ten Central Capabilities as Basic 
Threshold for Human Dignity  
From that Aristotelian legacy, Nussba-
um in a later publication proposes the 
“open-ended” list for societies to get the 
over lapping reference about our basic 
capabilities. Starting from this list, society 
can demand the government to protect it in 
its constitution. One major difference 
between Sen and Nussbaum is Sen leaves 
the capabilities approach in a more formal 
way and leaves the specific directives of the 
capabilities to be determined by the 
community. Nussbaum claims that she is 
going beyond Sen by proposing these ten 
central capabilities as a threshold for being 
accommodated in the constitutional pro-
cess. The ten capabilities are:  
1. Life: being able to live to the end of a 
human life of normal length; not 
dying prematurely, or before one’s life 
is so reduced as to be not worth living; 
2. Bodily health: being able to have good 
health, including reproductive health; 
to be adequately nourished; to have 
adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily integrity: being bale to move 
freely from place to place; to be 
secure against violent assault, 
including sexual assault and domestic 
violence; having opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, imagination and thought: 
being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason-and to do 
these things in a “truly human” way. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have 
attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves;  
6. Practical reason: being able to form a 
conception of the good and to engage 
in critical reflection about the 
planning of one’s life. 
7. Affiliation: a. being able to live with 
and toward others; b. having social 
bases of self-respect and 
nonhumiliation. 
8. Other species: being able to live with 
concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature. 
9. Play being able to laugh to play, to 
enjoy, recreational, activities. 
10. Control over one’s environment: a. 
political: being able to participate 
effectively in political choices that 
govern one’s life; b. material: being 
able to hold property.
25
 
By posing ten central capabilities, 
however, Nussbaum faces the charge of 
cultural imperialism. Nussbaum’s list has 
been critiqued as heavily biased by liberal 
culture. The notion of capabilities is 
embedded in culture. In order to make a 
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set list that fits for all culture, it means 
imposing one specific view of life or 
goodness upon other people who live in 
different worldviews. Nussbaum is aware of 
this criticism and replies that list is an 
initial draft for people in other cultures to 
reflect in the lights of their own capabilities. 
Nussbaum always refers to the idea of 
overlapping consensus. John Rawls original-
ly proposed this idea. He says that people 
with their own understanding of justice can 
enter public discourse and get a common 
understanding of the basic structure of the 
society. By this conviction, Nussbaum reply 
the relativistism as failed to get out from 
their monadic culture. People can critique 
the fact of injustice in other cultures 
because we have common reference to the 
values that we claim to be universal. For 
Nussbaum, society needs a normative con-
ception of social justice, and she endorses 
some basic content of it. We cannot say, 
“I’m for justice, but any conception of 
justice anyone comes up with is all right 
with me.”  We do not come to public 
discussion about basic construction of 
society without any specific proposal on 
what we think the good society is. Lisa 
Cahill, for example, supports Nussbaum’s 
position by showing that some western 
feminists fail to acknowledge the practice of 
injustice in other traditions because of 
reluctance to be charged with imposing 
one’s own values upon other.   
Nussbaum also differentiates between 
the issue of justification and the issue of 
implementation. By the issue of justifi-
cation, she means that people across the 
world will justify her list as a good basis for 
political principles, regardless their diffe-
rent ethnic or religious background. They 
may come with different religious opinions 
why society must respect the capability to 
speak freely, but in the end, the multi-
cultural society will agree that society must 
protect it. But, it will be different in the 
issue of implementation from one society to 
other. Some will secure it without limit; 
others will make a certain arrangement so 
that the freedom to speak will not make the 
society prone to greater cultural conflict. 
Cultural diversity requires respect-fulness 
between cultures.  
Nussbaum also defends her list as a 
basic open-ended proposal in public 
discourse, rather than letting the public it 
self make adjustments by adding to it or 
prioritizing which capabilities need more 
attention or are more urgent. Lisa Cahill 
amends the list by adding two other 
capabilities to the list, namely: kinship and 
religion. Being able to be a part of the 
family and being able to express their 
religious belief or belong to one religious 
group also constitutes someone’s capability 
and longing. The capability approach, then, 
must receive their contextuality and justifi-
cation in public discussion.  
Choice: Freedom to Flourish 
As mentioned before, the capability 
approach put much attention on the role of 
choice. Nussbaum claims that the capability 
approach is in line with the deontological 
view of person. Person is the end in her 
self. She criticized consequentialism, which 
seeks the maximum conditions for best 
consequences. Even if it starts from a 
certain conception of the good, consequen-
tialism can easily slide into abusing every 
necessary means for better or best out-
comes. On the other hand, Kant vigorously 
denied any political assumptions, that 
violates person’ fundamental entitlement. 
Deontology starts from the question of right 
and how in pursuing happiness we do not 
neglect the principle of impartiality and 
respect. The debate between “end justifies 
means” is at the heart of it, and Nuss-
baum’s capability approach places her 
lineage with Kant. She is concerned that 
the consequentialist view of development 
will sacrifice some member of the com-
munity who can be categorized as a burden: 
the old people, or those with disabilities. 
Consequentialists will ask, “why must 
society give attention to these kind of 
people who will affect lesser good outcomes 
for the society?”. This is what happens 
when the Nazi’s policy seeks to eliminate 
“the defect of the society”. Nussbaum sees 
that the consequentialist justification to use 
every means for best outcomes will also 
justify injustice in the society in the name 
of best outcome. But, she doesn’t reject the 
importance of outcomes in the political 
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system. In order to get the best outcome, 
society must respect the basic rights of the 
people, and respect every process in the 
making of good outcomes.  
What makes the person as central or as 
“the end for him self” is his ability of make 
choices. From the first part of this paper, 
we know that the Greek polis provided 
many resources in educating the youth in 
order to make them capable to make 
choices. Trained by this basic capability, the 
youth can take every available opportunity 
to be or to do. The ability to make choices 
requires the protection of human freedom. 
We make cannot make a choice if we don’t 
have freedom. Amartya Sen gives the 
example of “fasting and starving”. In 
fasting, people choose not to eat, but star-
ving happens because of lack of opportunity 
to get food. Development means giving 
people the ability to select what they think 
they could be or what could be done, and 
freedom is a space in which people can 
make choices. It is the reason for Sen to 
claim that “development as a freedom”.  
But, since the idea of freedom is very 
broad, what kind of freedom is essentially 
required for human flourishing? In this 
point, Nussbaum departs herself from Sen. 
Not all exercise of freedom is worthy 
enough to be called basic capabilities; some 
are essential and some are just trivial. 
Freedom to choose religion must not be on 
the same level with the freedom not to use 
helmet when driving motorcycle . Some 
form of freedom also puts the limits on the 
freedom of others. Michael Walzer point it 
rightly in The Sphere of Justice when he 
noted the threat of dominance of one 
sphere (money) to other sphere (political 
society). Some freedom also requires the 
idea of constraint. Someone can freely 
perform some action in such situations 
because the other person is constrained not 
to interfere in that situation.  
In this multi-layered nuance of free-
dom, Nussbaum concludes that we need to 
come to a basic list of what is the most 
required condition of human freedom. The 
ten basic capabilities address the question 
of freedom in the face of social justice: the 
freedom to have and use leisure time, the 
freedom in performing bodily integrity, the 
freedom to participate in any association. It 
is the duty of the government to secure 
these ten basic tenets of human freedom, 
and people have a right to demand that list 
to be incorporated in constitutional law.  
From these various forms of freedom, 
affiliation and practical reason play a 
distinctive architectonic role.  The good 
societal policy should incorporate these 
basic roles. Securing the freedom to use 
practical reason means giving a wide 
possibility to choose and plan their life. 
Promoting the freedom to affiliate means 
respecting the human nature as social 
being who need to interact with each other 
and build a community. For Nussbaum, 
these two roles are architectonic because 
the other forms of freedom will develop if 
only these two roles are secured and 
preserved.  
PART III - INTERSECTION AND 
DIVERGENCE 
By putting the common good theory 
side by side with capability approach, we 
can directly get the sense of intersection 
from these two theories, which have some 
common basic assumptions on how persons 
relate with the society. We can say that 
both theories originally come from the same 
source, on Aristotelian reading of histori-
city. While the common good in Catholic 
social tradition departs more from the 
Aristotelian metaphysical system, the capa-
bility approach draws more attention to the 
anthropological notion of human flouris-
hing.  
I find three interesting points of inter-
section and divergence from comparing the 
common good theory with the capability 
approach.  
Participation in Perfection Based on 
Human Capability  
The underlying concept in the common 
good is the Thomistic teleology of perfec-
tion. The common good for Aquinas is not 
just the condition that everyone can 
flourish fully, but as the final end of human 
inclination toward God. The final state of 
the common good is visio beatifica when 
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human being can “see face to face with” 
God.  
But, to be able to engage in the arduous 
journey of perfection, we must acknowledge 
our capability to engage in that process. 
Thus, the Thomistic teleology of goodness 
must be based on the anthropological 
assessment of human capability. Without 
being grounded in human capability to 
flourish and to attain the goodness, this 
teleological inclination is prone to be 
formalistic and far away from historical 
reality .  
The capability approach can be useful 
for the common good theory to trace down 
many areas of the incarnate good, goodness 
that is present in specific human culture 
and not just the abstract goodness across 
human history and time: goodness in our 
bodily integrity, goodness in leisure, 
goodness in political participation, goodness 
for having practical reason, goodness in 
living peacefully with other creatures. 
Nussbaum’s criticism of the GDP approach 
can be interpreted also as the criticism of 
“dry and empty universal goodness”, which 
does not count everybody as a unique 
person, as the end in herself.  
The era of “teleology from above” in my 
opinion is over. But, we can start the 
“teleology from below”, from the experience 
of each and every person’s capability to 
attain goodness and to flourish. I think that 
by making capabilities approach as the 
anthropological foundation, the theory of 
the common good can give a major 
contribution in directing cross cultural 
collaboration for a better world.  
Of course Nussbaum will reject the 
“teleology from below” because of her 
conviction on a freestanding moral theory. 
But, then we can ask: when Nussbaum 
rejects the order of being –that justifies 
human beings as superior to animal- and 
propose the animal capability, does it mean 
that there’s also a “metaphysical assump-
tion” on equality of creatures? If we rely 
only on the “intuitive assumption of 
common humanity” as she proposes, our 
intuition will easily say that human is 
superior than animal.  In order to say the 
opposite, we need more than “intuitive 
assumption” on creatures. The Christian 
tradition calls it: the natural law.  
The natural law can be interpreted not 
merely as an abstract and deductive 
metaphysical thinking, but also in more 
inductive way, by paying attention on the 
various experiences of God’s presence in 
human history. When God, the supreme 
good, creates the world, God shares her 
own goodness to the world.  The creation 
becomes the image of God, because by 
looking the goodness in other creatures, 
human being can see, even it is limited, the 
reflection of eternal goodness of God. 
Because human being can see the image of 
their Creator in other creation, they will 
respect them and will not do harm to them. 
The natural law tradition will say, “Do good 
and avoid evil.” By doing good to other 
creature, a person respects the reflection of 
goodness in other creature. On this very 
point, Catholic tradition of natural law can 
give solid foundation on Nussbaum’s 
passion of natural right.   
Contextualizing Capabilities as Stimulus 
for Intellectual Solidarity 
Proposing a theory of the common good 
“from below” in this pluralist society is also 
risky. There is a major challenge around 
our capacity to attain a single conception of 
the common good, when people come with 
their rich diverse backgrounds. Catholic 
thinkers are being charged to be “too 
optimistic” on human capacity in attaining 
a coherent view on idea of the good. One 
major critique of the common good theory 
comes from John Rawls. Rawls said that 
one criteria of public discourse is 
understandability, when our partner under-
stands what we are talking about and can 
agree or disagree with that. Engaging public 
discourse starting from particular concep-
tion of good will eliminate other people -
who does not share the same unders-
tanding- from the agora. So, Rawls use the 
idea of “public reason” which is so thin, 
leaving aside all our cultural background, so 
that other people could understand what 
we talk about and engage in public 
discourse. Therefore, by proposing public 
reason, Rawls refuses to talk about the 
common good. 
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Although communitarianism rejects 
Rawls public reason since all people are 
always embedded in their rich cultural 
context, they are in agreement with Rawls 
about the impossibility to think about the 
common good in multicultural society. 
Communitarianism has a tendency of cul-
tural relativism. Finding the common good 
means justifying the universal value of 
human culture, which is contrary to their 
conviction, because any claim on universal 
values will reject the uniqueness of tradi-
tion.  
In this debate on universal or situated 
good, the idea of intellectual solidarity can 
be very useful, not to make it an “either/or” 
situation but as an arena for civilized 
conversation between cultures. As Nussba-
um said, cultural relativism is entrapped in 
the monadic notion of good, as if the idea of 
goodness is incommunicable. Cultural 
relativism has also failed to address the 
problem of “adaptive preference” within 
one’s own culture. In the heart of the 
capability approach and the common good, 
there is an optimism of human possibility to 
make “conversation within and between 
culture”, to find a sense of connectedness, 
and finally to engage in the global respon-
sibility. As the world is increasingly connec-
ted, we require a more robust vision of the 
goodness that we can share with others. 
The experience of interdependence 
challenges us to reflect on how the 
contextual human flourishing can be 
supported by global community 
The idea of communio in the common 
good theory and Nussbaum’s idea on the 
architectonic role of affiliation are 
grounded in the human ability to connect 
with each other. Then, ten central capa-
bilities can be interpreted as the trajectory 
of communal conversation: how political 
arrangements in the society can help every 
member or group to attain their fullness by 
securing these capabilities. I strongly agree 
with Lisa Cahill’s argument not to abandon 
the ten areas of capabilities proposed by 
Nussbaum, but to amend and contextualize 
the list intra and extra community. Animal 
rights are a good vision but it seems not 
urgent and too bourgeois in developing 
countries that still struggle for more 
openness and accountability in political and 
economic activity.  
The Embeddedness of Choice 
Since the capability approach puts 
choice as central, in what degree does 
society affect our ability to make choices? I 
don’t believe in black and white opposition 
between determinism-freedom, as if it is a 
matter of either personal freedom or 
societal deterministic. We find a societal 
influence in our capability to choose, and 
we notice also individual contributions to 
the societal construction. The common 
good gives more nuances to this topic, 
rather than in the capability approach. 
Since the capability approach is affiliated 
with the Kantian deontological point of 
view, I found that their reflection of how 
this back-forward relationship between 
personal freedom and society worked was 
limited.  
Charles Taylor shows this awareness by 
analyzing the human phenomenon of 
language.  Human language shows two 
sides, freedom and community, of the same 
coin. First, human being cannot be separa-
ted from the network of relations as shown 
by a person’s speech acts. Someone can 
speak a language because he is part of a 
community. There is no language outside 
the community. Second, although he is part 
of the community, he still has freedom and 
creativity to explore a language to convey 
meaning, his hopes, and his ideals. Com-
munities allow languages to happen, but in 
the end it is “I" who speaks. There is no 
conflict between freedom and community, 
because these two things are mutually 
presupposed. Eliminating one of them –
either freedom or community– will only 
lead to totalitarianism, whether individua-
list totalitarianism –which adores freedom 
at all cost– or communalist totali-tarianism 
–when togetherness suppresses initiatives 
and personal freedom. 
Taylor’s phenomenology of human 
language shows in some degree that, we live 
in a chosen society. It is the mothers –
representing the community- who chooses 
the language for their baby. Of course, 20 
years later she can speak German, French, 
A Capability to Promote the Common Good (Paulus Bambang Irawan) 
12 
Swahili, but the “taste of mother tongue” 
cannot fade away. We find the cultural 
embeddedness, either great or low, and it 
affects our sense of choices.  
The capabilities approach was right 
when they criticized “adaptive preference” 
in the society, and we should also recognize 
the hidden injustice in culture. But, at the 
same time, the capabilities approach does 
not recognize that the ability to choose is 
itself affected by cultural preferences. In 
this situation, the common good approach 
can give more attention to that reality 
rather than the capability approach.  
CONCLUSION: A CAPABILITY TO 
PROMOTE THE COMMON GOOD  
Jacques Maritain quotes Pius XII 
encyclical Mystici Corpiris Christi as the 
Magna Charta of the Christian humanism: 
in natural body, the principle of unity so 
unites the parts that each lack its own 
individual subsistence; on the contrary in 
the Mystical Body that mutual union, 
though intrinsic, links the members by a 
bond which leaves to each intact his own 
personalit all different members are 
ultimately destined to the good of the 
whole alone; while every moral associa-
tion of men, if we look to its ultimate 
usefulness, is in the end directed to the 
advancement of all and of every single 
member. For they are persons, utpote 
personae sunt.   
The experience of lackness must not be 
interpreted as badness. Lackness can also 
become the drive of progression, a passion 
to come out from our monadic self to meet 
each other. Martha Nussbaum loves to 
quote Marin Luther King’s “human dignity 
like a check which has come back marked 
"insufficient funds.”  Conditions of insuffi-
ciency develop our awareness that these 
conditions should not be allowed to happen 
again, and our constitution must protect 
various areas where our humanity prevails. 
If we always think that we are abundant 
enough as a society, the sensitivity to move 
forward to the Mystical Body will not be 
present.  
The experience of being lacking drives 
us to look to our arduous end, to the 
fullness of humanity. It is not in the blessed 
future, but in every single action to engage 
with other in the society, to draw the 
goodness that present in human history. 
Since it is already present in human 
history, even not yet complete, we have the 
capability to pursue and promote it. In this 
spirit, we can define development as a call 
to secure and flourish our capability to 
promote the common good. That make us a 
human person, utpote personae sunt! 
Paulus Bambang Irawan 
Graduate of Doctoral Programs in Boston College 
School of Theology and Ministry, Massachusetts, 
USA. Lecturer at the Faculty of Theology, University 
of Sanata Dharma Yogyakarta. 
Email: bambs@usd.ac.id 
 
1  Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New 
York: Knopf, 1999). 
2
  Marta Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy”, 
in Liberalism and the Good, edited by R. Bruce 
Dauglass, Gerald R. Mara, and Henry S. 
Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 203-252.  
3
  David Hollenbach, The Common Good and 
Christian Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 6-7. 
4
  Sussane M. DeCrane. Aquinas, Feminism and The 
Common Good (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 43-44. 
5
  Thomas Aquinas. Expositio Libri De 
Hebdomadibus I.2. cited in John Rziha, Perfecting 
Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human 
participation in Eternal Law (Washington D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 8. 
6
  Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputate De 
Veritate, Q.21, a.2; cited in Sussane M. DeCrane, 
Aquinas, Feminism and The Common Good, 50. 
7
  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.II.Q.90 a.2. 
8
  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.II.Q.47 
a.10; cited by Jacques Maritain, The Person and 
Common Good (Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame, 2009), 47. 
9
  Mater et Magistra 65 
10
  Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern 
“Defining Global Public Goods,” Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century (New York: Oxford, 1999), 2-19. 
11
  Gaudium et Spes 26, Mater et Magistra 53. 
12
  David Hollenbach, “The Common Good Revisited,” 
Theological Studies 50 (1989): 70. 
13
  David Hollenbach, The Common Good and 
Christian Ethics, 138. 
14
  David Hollenbach, “Religion and Political Life”, 
Theological Studies 52 (1991):88. 
15
  Cicero, De Re Publica, I, SSV, 39; cited in David 
Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian 
Ethics, 65. 
JURNAL TEOLOGI, Volume 05, Nomor 01, Mei 2016: 1-14 
13 
 
16
  Grace Y. Kao. Grounding Human Right, 
(Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 
2011), 104. 
17
  “A person who is going to make a fitting inquiry 
into the best political arrangement must first get 
clear about what the most choiceworthy life is – for 
if this is unclear, the best political arrangement 
mus remain unclear also” Politics 1323a17-19, 
cited in Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social 
Democracy, 208. 
18
  Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, 209. 
19
  “It is evident that the best politeia is the 
arrangement according to which anyone 
whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing 
life”. Aristotle, Politics 1324a23-5; cited in Martha 
Nussbaum, “Nature, Function, and Capability: 
Aristotle on Political Distribution” in Marx and 
Aristotle, ed. G. McCarthy (Savage, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1992), 176 
20
  “It is the job of the excellent lawgiver to consider, 
concerning a city and a class of human beings and 
every other association, how they will partake in 
the flourishing living that is possible for them.” 
Aristotle, Politics, 1325a7 ff.; Nussbaum, 
Aristotelian Social Democracy, 177. 
21
  Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, 175  
22
  “We believe that no citizen should be lacking in 
sustenance support. As for the common meal, 
everyone agrees that they are a valuable institution 
in a well ordered city”. Aristotle, Politics 1329b39 
ff. See also Politics 1330b11”The things that we 
use most of and most frequently where our bodies 
are concerned, these have the biggest impact on 
health. Water and air are things of that sort. So, 
good political planning should make some 
decisions about these things”, cited in Martha 
Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, 204. 
23
  In Politics 1271a26-37, 1272a12-21, Aristotle 
criticized people of Sparta who fail to support the 
poor to participate in common meal and even make 
a penalty for the poor who cannot pay for all civic 
participation. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social 
Democracy, 204.  
24
  Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities 
(Cambridge Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 22. 
25
  Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 33-34.  
26
  Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental 
Entitlements” in Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues 
and Problems, ed. Alexander Kaufman (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 58. 
27
  Lisa Sowle Cahil, Sex, Gender and Equality, cited 
in Sussane M. DeCrane, Aquinas, Feminism and 
The Common Good, 37.  
28
  Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental 
Entitlements”, 56. 
29
  Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 39. 
30
  Jürgen Motlmann criticize the Thomistic tendency 
to put complete goodness in the future and but not 
quite embed it in the reality of the present, because 
human being is always in the status in via, or in the 
journey to God. Ju ̈rgen Moltmann “Christian Hope: 
Messianic of Transcendent: A Theological 
 
Discussion with Joachim of Fiore and Thomas 
Aquinas”, Horizon 12/2 (1985): 328-348. 
31
  For further discussion on the critique to Nussbaum 
claim on a freestanding moral theory see Grace 
Y.Kao, Grounding Human Rights in a Pluralist 
World, 125-129. 
32
  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.Q.5 a.5. 
33
  David Hollenbach, “A Communitarian Reconstruc-
tion of Human Rights” in Catholicism and 
Liberalism: Contributions to American Public 
Philosophy, edited by R. Bruce Douglass & David 
Hollenbach (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 130. 
34
  Mystici Corporis Christi, cited in Jacques Maritain, 
The person and Common Good, 29, f22.  
35
  Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 30.  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
DeCrane, Sussane M. Aquinas, Feminism 
and The Common Good. Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2004. 
Hollenbach, David. “The Common Good 
Revisited.” Theological Studies 50 
(1989): 70-90. 
____. “Religion and Political Life.” 
Theological Studies 52 (1991): 60-88. 
____. “A communitarian reconstruction of 
human rights” in Catholicism and 
Liberalism: Contributions to 
American Public Philosophy, eds. R. 
Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach. 
130-158. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
____. The Common Good and Christian 
Ethics. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Kao, Grace Y. Grounding Human Right. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011. 
Kaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. 
Stern “Defining Global Public Goods” 
in: Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, 
Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century. 10-30. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
A Capability to Promote the Common Good (Paulus Bambang Irawan) 
14 
 
Maritain, Jacques. The Person and 
Common Good. Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame, 2009 edition. 
Nussbaum, Marta. “Aristotelian Social 
Democracy”, in Liberalism and the 
Good, eds. R. Bruce Dauglass, Gerald 
R. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson. 
203-252. New York: Routledge, 1990.  
____. “Nature, Function, and Capability: 
Aristotle on Political Distribution” in 
Marx and Aristotle, ed. G. McCarthy. 
175-211. Savage, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1992. 
____. “Capabilities as Fundamental 
Entitlements” in Capabilities Equa-
lity: Basic Issues and Problems, ed. 
Alexander Kaufman. 44-70. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____. Creating Capabilities. Cambridge 
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011. 
Rziha, John. Perfecting Human Actions: St. 
Thomas Aquinas on Human 
participation in Eternal Law. 
Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2009. 
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. 
New York: Kropt, 1999. 
 
 
